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6From the late 1960s through the 1990s, Northern Irelandhas been ravaged by a series of political upheavals com-monly referred to as “the Troubles.” The conflict orig-
inated as a territorial dispute, articulated along religious
lines, over whether the land currently known as Northern Ire-
land should remain within the United Kingdom (UK) or
become part of a “United Ireland.” This conflict has resulted
in the deaths of approximately three and a half thousand peo-
ple, and injuries to at least forty thousand others. Human
rights violations have been at the heart of the conflict in
Northern Ireland, con-
sistently serving as flash-
points for violence and
distrust, and undermin-
ing the rule of law for the
past thirty years.
Although human rights
violations did not cause
the conflict, their contin-
ual occurrence has pro-
longed and further
entrenched the conflict.
On April 10, 1998,
after thirty years of bloody
discord, political parties
from each side of the con-
flict signed a peace agree-
ment known as the Good
Friday Agreement
(Agreement), pledging to
dedicate themselves anew
to “the achievement of
reconciliation, tolerance,
and mutual trust, and to
the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.”
The Agreement contained a number of human rights
pledges, including, but not limited to a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland, a Human Rights Commission, and reform
of policing procedures. 
Despite the numerous mechanisms for protecting human
rights outlined in the Agreement, effective realization of
human rights has been elusive. According to the 1999 Human
Rights Watch World Report on the UK, the initial imple-
mentation of the Agreement “proved disappointing,” as the
British government “consistently failed to translate the pro-
visions into practical and effective human rights protec-
tions.” In the years since the Agreement, implementation of
its provisions has proved unsatisfactory in overcoming years
of bitter conflict and human rights violations.
Background: The Origins of the Conflict
The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland stem from
the English colonization of predominantly Catholic Ireland
in the sixteenth century. This period of colonization was fol-
lowed in the seventeenth century by the movement of Protes-
tant English and Scottish settlers into Ireland. Bolstered by
repressive legislation, the Protestants soon established their
ascendancy over the Catholics. In 1800, Ireland became
part of the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland. In 1916,
the Easter Rising by Irish republicans led to the War of
Independence, which resulted in the partition of Ireland into
what is today Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The Troubles began with the struggle of the minority
Catholic population of Northern Ireland for civil liberties in
the late 1960s. On February 1, 1967, the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was founded, and its
demands laid out at least some of the terrain over which the
conflict was to be fought for
the next quarter of a century
or more: a universal franchise;
an end to electoral gerryman-
dering; the fair allocation of
public housing; an end to dis-
crimination in local govern-
ment employment; the repeal
of the Special Powers Act (the
forerunner of today’s anti-ter-
rorist legislation); and the dis-
banding of the exclusively
Protestant reserve police force,
the “B Specials.” 
The civil rights movement
that started in the 1960s
demonstrated that Catholics
were no longer prepared to
accept discriminatory laws and
practices set down by a Protes-
tant Parliament and a Protes-
tant state. The violent reaction
of extremist Protestants to
NICRA’s peaceful protest
marches and the failure of the mainly Protestant Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to defend the protesters laid
down the battle lines for the conflict that ensued. 
In August 1969, British troops were deployed in Northern
Ireland to defend the Catholics from increasing sectarian
attacks. Yet by January 1972, when the British army shot
and killed 13 unarmed demonstrators in the streets of Derry,
Northern Ireland, in an event known as “Bloody Sunday,” no
vestige remained of the initial welcome Catholics had
extended to the soldiers. The British army’s role had changed
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7from being part of the solution to being part of the problem,
so far as Catholics were concerned. By the time a cease-fire
was declared in August 1994, the British army had killed 294
people, 160 of them civilians, nearly all of whom were
Catholics.
The array of emergency legislation and measures
employed by the UK government in its attempts to contain
and defeat terrorism, ranging from internment without trial
to trial without jury, have also served to prolong and exac-
erbate the conflict. These measures have given rise to alle-
gations of countless other human rights violations, includ-
ing harassment of both Protestant and Catholic civilians,
miscarriages of justice, and abuse of lethal force.
Highlighting Past Human Rights Violations
Bloody Sunday
In a state where tensions still run high, reconciliation is
essential. Past human rights violations, particularly those
that remain unresolved, continue to play a central role in the
fragile peace process. One example of such unresolved vio-
lations concerns the events of Bloody Sunday, during which
the British army shot or wounded
approximately twenty-six unarmed,
Catholic demonstrators partici-
pating in the peaceful civil rights
march in Derry. The actions of the
British army drew both local and
international condemnation, and
have since been a great source of
underlying tension.
In the wake of Bloody Sunday,
the British government initiated a
public judicial inquiry to investigate the incident. Public
inquiries are established under the Tribunals of Inquiry
(Evidence) Act of 1921, which allows for the investigation of
“a definite matter of urgent public importance” by an inde-
pendent tribunal. They are inquisitional rather than adver-
sarial in nature, and primarily aimed at establishing the
truth about what happened and making recommendations
for the avoidance of a repetition. This first official inquiry
report, issued by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery,
only eleven weeks after the events, concluded that the British
soldiers acted in self defense, and fired only in response to
shots allegedly fired at them. This inquiry, however, was
much discredited for inadequately considering all the rele-
vant evidence in deciding the soldiers’ culpability for the civil-
ian casualties. On January 29, 1998, the British governmen-
t’s announcement of a second public inquiry into the events
of Bloody Sunday some twenty-six years later, made legal his-
tory, as it effectively quashed the findings of Lord Widgery’s
long-discredited inquiry. 
The second Bloody Sunday inquiry has also been dogged
by controversy. Due to the colossal amount of evidence
involved, the substantive proceedings did not begin until
November 2000, almost three years after the initial announce-
ment. Furthermore, the proceedings have been slow, with the
opening statements alone lasting over three months. The cost
has already exceeded U.S.$53 million, and with an anticipated
two years of hearings ahead, this inquiry is set to be the
most expensive one to date. 
In addition to the cost, the inquiry has been faced with
important evidentiary problems. For example, the soldiers who
fired shots have succeeded in retaining their anonymity, much
to the distress of the wounded and the relatives of those who
died. Further, the Ministry of Defense has destroyed many of
the weapons used, even after receiving orders to preserve the
weapons as evidence. Finally, the difficulty of reconstructing
events that took place almost thirty years ago presents diffi-
culties for the second inquiry. Specifically, some witnesses
are challenged by faulty memories, many witnesses have died
in the intervening years, and the many articles and docu-
mentaries about Bloody Sunday have colored recollections.
Targeting Civilians
Among the many thousands of victims of the conflict
during the last thirty years are two members of the legal pro-
fession. One of them was Belfast solicitor Patrick Finucane,
who was murdered in 1989. Since his death, it has emerged
that both British army intelligence and the RUC colluded in
his killing. In March 1999, Rosemary Nelson, a solicitor who
campaigned for a public inquiry into Patrick Finucane’s
death, was killed in a car bomb. Like Finucane, RUC officers
and soldiers had threatened her life before she died. Unlike
Funicane, however, Nelson had complained about her situ-
ation to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers, Dato’
Param Cumaraswamy, and had
spoken before the United States
Congress about the difficulties she
faced in her daily work. Thus far,
the British government has
ignored the continual call from
the international human rights
community and the U.S. Congress
for independent inquiries into their deaths.
Other casualties include the death of Robert Hamill, a
young Catholic man who was kicked to death by a loyalist mob
in 1997 in Portadown, Northern Ireland, because of his reli-
gion. Although his attackers did not know him, they assumed
he was a Catholic because of the direction from which he
came and where he was headed. Because of the fact that four
armed RUC officers were present in a vehicle only yards
away, Hamill thought it would be safe to walk past the loy-
alists. When the gang attacked him, however, the RUC offi-
cers did nothing to help him. This case is one of many high-
lighting the problem of sectarian attacks and harassment
within Northern Ireland, where one group ascribes a pejo-
rative set of attributes to the other based on its perceived reli-
gious, political, or community affiliations, and attacks based
on those attributes.
After this incident, the RUC issued statements alleging that
its officers had come under attack, and had even been
injured during the incident. In 2000 the coroner aban-
doned attempts to hold an inquest—a formal inquisitorial
hearing held when a death has happened in suspicious or
unknown circumstances—because witnesses were too afraid
to testify. Although six men were charged with the murder,
only one stood trial, and due to the lack of police evidence
against him, he was merely convicted of affray, or disorderly
conduct. 
In 1997, Billy Wright, a dissident loyalist leader, was
murdered in Northern Ireland’s Maze prison by dissident
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8republican prisoners, whom the prison authorities had housed
in the same wing. Wright was on his way to a visit from his girl-
friend when the three dissident republican prisoners climbed
over the prison roof and shot him inside the prison transport
van. Not only were the republican prisoners able to smuggle
weapons into the jail to accomplish this murder, but they also
were able to cut through a wire fence completely undetected.
Evidence collected shows that a prison officer was called away
from a crucial watchtower just at the time of the murder and
a vital security camera was out of action. Further, the evidence
suggests that the murderers
had advance warning that
Wright was due to receive a
visit on the morning of his
death. Despite the uncer-
tainty surrounding this situa-
tion, the government has
been reluctant to answer the
many outstanding questions
surrounding this murder,
and has refused to disclose
the name of the governor in
charge of the prison on the
day of the murder. 
The Good Friday Peace
Agreement: Reconciling
Past Human Rights 
Violations
The Agreement set forth
the parties’ main aspirations
for protecting human rights,
including but not limited to
the following rights: the right of free political thought; the
right to freedom and expression of religion; the right to seek
constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;
the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activ-
ity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender, or ethnicity;
and the right to freedom from sectarian harassment. More
importantly, the Agreement provided various mechanisms
to secure and protect human rights, and outlined ways to
reform the various state institutions. 
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
(NIHRC or Commission) was established on March 1, 1999.
Created by the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 (Act), section
68, in compliance with a commitment made by the British
Government in the Good Friday Agreement, the Commission
was charged with drawing up a Bill of Rights for Northern
Ireland. This development is unique because it is the first
human rights commission established within the UK. As
such, Northern Ireland will be the first part of the UK to have
its own Bill of Rights. 
The NIHRC is independent from the government but is
accountable to Parliament through the secretary of state. The
Commission’s mandate includes the following duties: to
review the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice
relating to the protection of human rights; to advise the
secretary of state and the Executive Committee of the North-
ern Ireland Assembly of legislative and other measures,
which ought to be taken to protect human rights; to advise
the Northern Ireland Assembly regarding compatibility of
legislation with human rights obligations; to promote under-
standing and awareness of the importance of human rights
in Northern Ireland; and to provide advice to the Secretary
of State on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation,
rights supplementary to those in the European Convention
on Human Rights (European Convention), which was incor-
porated into UK law in 2000. The NIHRC also has the power
to assist individuals with proceedings involving law or prac-
tice concerning the protection of human rights; bring pro-
ceedings involving law or practice concerning the protection
of human rights; conduct such investigations as it considers
necessary or expedient for
the purpose of exercising
its other functions; and pub-
lish its advice and the out-
come of its research and
investigations.
Despite its ambitious
beginnings, the NIHRC has
come under attack, and its
proper functioning has
been inhibited in a num-
ber of ways. For one, the
Commission’s budget is
insufficient to achieve its
wide mandate. Further, the
Commission’s limited pow-
ers of investigation and lim-
ited right to make repre-
sentations have
undermined its function.
These limitations were
highlighted when the chief
coroner in Northern Ire-
land, charged with initiating inquests, asked the NIHRC to
advise him on the disclosure of information prior to the
inquest on the Omagh bombing case—a bombing that
caused the greatest number of casualties on Northern Ireland
soil since the Troubles began—but then declined to allow the
NIHRC to make representations at the inquest itself. The
NIHRC sought judicial review of his refusal, but the Lord
Chief Justice, Sir Robert Carswell, declined to support the
Commission’s right to intervene. 
Important leaders within Northern Ireland have attacked
the legality of the NIHRC and its mandate, placing the work
of the Commission at severe risk. For example, David Trim-
ble, the First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly, has
attacked the NIHRC over the composition of their equality
working group, claiming the group has no legal authority to
draft a Bill of Rights, despite the fact that both the NIHRC
and the Bill of Rights are organs of the Good Friday Agree-
ment. An attack from the First Minister is particularly trou-
bling because he has primary responsibility for human rights
in Northern Ireland. 
Policing
No review of current human rights concerns in Northern
Ireland would be complete without reference to the reform
of policing. As a product of the historical and political forces
that have been at the heart of the conflict in Northern
Ireland, the RUC was a paramilitary organization, organized
along quasi-military lines, armed, and tasked with combat-
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9ing terrorism. Although the RUC’s mandate was to uphold
the rule of law, prevent crime, keep the peace, and per-
form all the other roles of ordinary police forces, its para-
military role inevitably encroached on its ability to carry out
normal policing. Individual officers within the RUC and
their families have paid a very high price in terms of death
and injury throughout the conflict, with over 300 deaths
and 9,304 injuries to RUC officers in the last thirty years.
The RUC was not able to maintain a neutral position, sep-
arating republicans from loyalists, and keeping the peace. As
part of the security forces of the UK, like those of any coun-
try, they were concerned not only with maintaining law and
order, but also with upholding the union between Northern
Ireland and Britain. Given the nature of the conflict in North-
ern Ireland, any police force, regardless of its composition,
would have found itself in opposition to the nationalist com-
munity, whose aspiration is the abolition of Northern Ire-
land and the creation of a united Ireland. This situation has
been gravely compounded by the fact that, for both histori-
cal and political reasons, approximately ninety-two percent of
the members of the security forces were drawn from the
Protestant community, and were inevitably unionist in their
sympathies. This imbalance in composition was a factor in the
conflict and led to many allegations of official collusion
between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. As doc-
umented by human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International and the Committee on the Administration of Jus-
tice in Belfast, RUC officers were responsible for causing
deaths, sometimes in disputed circumstances, and there were
many substantiated allegations of severe ill-treatment of those
detained under emergency laws. 
Nowhere was the inability of the RUC to carry out normal
peace-time policing more sharply demonstrated than in the
ghastly practice of so-called punishment beatings and shoot-
ings, usually carried out against young men suspected of anti-
social behavior such as drug dealing and stealing cars. Victims
of punishment beatings were guaranteed no form of due
process, and such encounters often resulted in horrific injuries
to the victims or even death. These unjust activities raised fun-
damental questions about policing in Northern Ireland. Per-
haps the most significant thing about punishment beatings,
when considering them in the context of policing, was that they
occurred in both nationalist and loyalist communities.
Although crude and inexcusable, such practices reflected a
basic urge in both communities to curb and deter anti-social
behavior. Also highly significant was the fact that these prac-
tices could not take place without at least the tacit support of
the communities. This type of rough justice usurped the role
of normal policing, to the disadvantage of its victims and the
communities in which it occurred. The challenge facing
police reform is to establish a police service to which both com-
munities will relinquish the right to deal with anti-social ele-
ments fairly, with due process, and without violence.
The role of the RUC was further distorted from the norm
by the fact that it operated under emergency laws from its
inception. The laws disfigured the criminal justice system in
virtually every aspect, as they deprived suspects of trial by
jury, reduced the standard of admissibility of confession evi-
dence, and allowed the drawing of adverse inferences from a
defendant’s remaining silent, to mention only the most seri-
ous of their inroads into defendants’ rights. The RUC not only
operated under these draconian laws, but did so under min-
imal scrutiny, until reforms were enacted to allow lawyers to
be present during interrogations and allow the use of video-
and audio-recording of police interviews. It is not surprising
that human rights groups, such as British Irish RIGHTS WATCH,
have received many allegations of abuse of defense lawyers, mis-
carriages of justice, and ill-treatment of those in RUC custody.
The case for reform of the RUC was overwhelming, and
proved one of the most contentious of all the Good Friday
Agreement proposals, despite the fact that both nationalists
and unionists on the ground were eager for reform. The Pat-
ten Commission (Patten), set up under the Agreement to
make recommendations for reforming policing, issued
promising recommendations on police reform, and the gov-
ernment pledged to implement its proposals in full. Union-
ist politicians, however, turned policing into a political foot-
ball, demanding concessions on policing in return for their
continued participation in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
The Policing Act of 2000, which is intended to implement
Patten, includes a succession of weak provisions that have
failed to break the political link between the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland and the Chief Constable of the RUC,
and have robbed the new Policing Board and the Police
Ombudsman of powers recommended by Patten for curbing
the unaccountable scope of operational decisions. Many
unionists were reluctant to see even the name or the uniform
of the RUC changed, let alone its composition or its ability
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to serve all of the community equally. The nationalist polit-
ical parties retaliated to the weakening of Patten’s propos-
als by refusing to take their seats on the new Policing Board.
In their August 2001 package of proposals for the imple-
mentation of the Good Friday Agreement, the British and
Irish governments undertook to publish a revised Imple-
mentation Plan for policing reform, which has persuaded one
of the nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labor
Party, to take up its seats on the Policing Board. 
Among others, the U.S. Congress is concerned about the
failure to implement properly the Patten recommendations.
Other groups, such as British Irish RIGHTS WATCH, view the
greatest concern about policing in Northern Ireland as Pat-
ten’s refusal to address the question of how to root out those
who were serial human rights abusers under the old system.
Policing will change in Northern Ireland only if Catholic
nationalists are sufficiently confident to join and remain in the
new police service in numbers. This is unlikely to happen while
RUC officers who used violence, lies, and collusion as their daily
working methods are allowed to remain in place, without
ever being brought to justice and without having to take the
new oath. Unless Catholics can be persuaded to join and
remain in the new police service, the rule of law will continue
to be problematic in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
Many argue that Northern Ireland needs a truth and rec-
onciliation commission to deal with its past human rights
abuses, but the possibility of Northern Ireland’s establishing
a truth commission is highly unlikely. Truth commissions
have tended to be established in states in which regimes
have changed and the incoming governments have been pre-
pared to allow investigators to subject the former govern-
ment’s activities to scrutiny. Such conditions do not exist in
Northern Ireland, and resistance to any development on the
part of the “securocrats,” i.e., intelligence services and oth-
ers who are responsible for state security, is likely to ensure
that a truth commission never develops. Without a truth
commission, there will be continued domestic and interna-
tional pressure for costly public inquiries that may go on for
years and possibly hinder the peace process itself.
In hindsight, the human rights provisions of the Good Fri-
day Agreement have been more well-intentioned than well-
implemented. The Agreement offers a unique opportunity
to consider the human rights deficit in Northern Ireland
holistically. British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and other NGOs
advocated for the wholesale reform of the system of crimi-
nal justice, looking at the issues of policing, emergency laws
and the system itself as arms of a single entity. Instead, the
government has allowed the criminal justice system to be
reviewed piecemeal, resulting in an incoherent strategy that
will not ensure the integrated and radical reforms that are
essential to the development of stability and peace in North-
ern Ireland. The conflict is by no means over. According to
British Irish RIGHTS WATCH’s calculations, over 170 people
have died since the 1994 cease-fires. The fear for most is that
missing the opportunity for more coherent human rights
reforms in Northern Ireland, together with the absence of
any effective mechanism for dealing with past abuses, may
one day be seen as having been a fatal error. 
* Jane Winter is the Director of British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and a
former Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at
the University of London. Natasha Parassram Concepcion is a J.D.
candidate at the Washington College of Law and co-editor-in-chief of
the Human Rights Brief.
legitimacy of South Africa’s partial amnesty (that will likely pro-
tect perpetrators from international prosecution), Burma’s
future democratic transition will require a formal reckoning
with responsibility for past human rights violations. 
Conclusion
Burma has much to gain from formally engaging with the
ideas and policy options of transitional justice as a means of
ensuring the legitimacy of future political change. To grasp
the significance of these issues, it is important to consider that
transitional justice in both theory and practice is structured
by two basic principles: first, a recognition that each nation’s
transitional experience is unique and molded by distinct
social, cultural, and historical factors; and second, that there
are basic moral understandings, legal principles, and logisti-
cal issues common to all democratic transitions. By formally
acknowledging the second principle—evoking the language
of transitional justice, seeking to learn from the experiences
of other nations, and openly accepting basic international
human rights standards—Burma may well increase the inter-
national community’s willingness to respect the first princi-
ple— Burma’s need to find its own solutions to its problems. 
By addressing its violent past, Burma can ensure that a
future transition is accepted at an international level while
retaining a relatively high degree of autonomy regarding spe-
cific policy decisions. In negotiating its future political tran-
sition, Burma need not engage in full-scale prosecutions
and may or may not choose to grant some form of amnesty
to past perpetrators. To achieve the international legitimacy
necessary for a successful transition, however, Burma must
formally reckon with its legacy of gross violations of human
rights and the related questions of responsibility. 
* Daniel Rothenberg is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the
University of Michigan; Fellow, Michigan Society of Fellows. 
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